Agency costs of free cash flow : the South African experience by Ankude, Edem Komla
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
AGENCY COSTS OF FREE CASH FLOW - THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
Edem Komla Ankude 

A Master' s dissertation presented to the Department of Accounting at the 

University of Cape Town in partial fulfilment of the requirements 

for the Master of Commerce degree 

in Financial Management 

30 September, 1997 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
I undersigned nprpn'V IS own 
or in submitted at 
nnrpr",,"u for a ale:g:rc~e. 
~. ••••••• • •••••• * •• • •• 
not nn'u"",, ~
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
ABSTRACT 

The use of free cash flow has been a source of conflict between shareholders and 
managers. This conflict derives from the agency relationship between shareholders and 
managers in that decisions taken by managers (as agents) affect the shareholders (as 
principals). The decisions of managers may not always be in the interest of 
shareholders. The interests of shareholders will be served if actions of managers lead 
to the maximisation of the total value of the company. The free cash flow theory 
suggests that managers have the tendency to misuse surplus cash resources. Any use 
of free cash flow that is not value maximising could result in losses to shareholders. 
These are termed the agency costs of free cash flow. It is believed that managers will 
think and act as shareholders if they own significant proportions of the equity capital of 
companies. 
This dissertation examines the effects of the agency relationship on the utilisation of 
free cash flow. To investigate these issues, some companies listed on the industrial 
sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were selected and divided into two basic 
groups. These groups are owner controlled companies and manager controlled 
companies. It was feared that the growth levels of the companies may blur the results 
and so they were further categorised into low growth companies and high growth 
companies. Whereas the first stage of the analysis dealt with companies categorised by 
either control structure or growth, the second stage considered companies categorised 
jointly by control structure and growth. Ratios indicative of the use of free cash flow 
were computed for each group and compared by means of box and whisker plots and 
the t-test. On the whole, the primary analyses showed that control structures do not 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is generally accepted that the prime objective of business is the maximisation of 
shareholders' wealth (e.g. Van Home 1995, 3 & Copeland & Weston 1988, 18). 
Although it is simply stated, there are a wide range of views on how to achieve this 
objective. It can be defined in terms of the maximisation of the firm's total market 
value or the price per share of its common stock or the value of its owners' equity 
(Levy & Sarnat 1977, 526). This diversity of opinion is compounded by different 
categories of claimants on the firm These claimants are debt holders, employees, 
suppliers, customers and the society at large. Each of them strives to derive the 
greatest possible return from the relationship with the firm Shareholders want 
companies to be profitable, debt holders require companies to be governed in ways 
which guarantee them interest payments and loan repayments, and employees desire 
good remuneration. Obviously, conflicts of interest are bound to occur periodically 
among these groups ifmanagement attempts to satisfy anyone of them. 
Shareholders' wealth maximisation objective can be achieved by maximising the total 
market value of the firm. Ideally, activities within the firm should be directed towards 
maximising firm value. A note of caution in this regard is that certain actions which 
lead to the maximisation of the total market value of the company may not necessarily 
lead to an increase in shareholders' wealth. For instance by introducing additional 
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economic model to the recognition of behavioural considerations in the decision­
making process in financial management. 
The structure of claims derives from the corporate form. The corporate form is 
characterised by the participation of the public in the affairs of companies by virtue of 
share ownership. This arrangement has brought a contract of agency between 
managers and outside shareholders. 'Outside shareholders' as used here refers to 
shareholders who do not take part in the day to day management of companies. The 
provisions of the contract of agency are well laid out in both common law and 
companies' acts ofvarious countries. At common law, the directors ofa company are 
expected to act for the benefit of the company and also to exercise reasonable care and 
skill in performing their duties. What is 'reasonable' depends on the circumstances 
surrounding a particular transaction and is not conclusively defined by the law. In any 
case it can be regarded as actions founded on rationalism as opposed to opportunism. 
The parties to this contract of agency are the shareholders or the principals who 
engage the services of managers as agents to perform tasks on their behalf. Normally, 
such relationships involve the delegation of some decision-making authority. The 
puzzle which arises is whether the actions of managers would be in consonance with 
the expectations of shareholders. If rational utility maximising behaviour is assumed 
on the part of both parties then there is the possibility that the agent may act in his own 
interest rather than that of the principal (Jensen & Meckling 1976,85). This assertion 
draws support from financial-economic theory which endorses the view that a 
reasonable motivation for human behaviour is personal wealth maximisation (Dobson 
1993, 57). The divergence of the agent from the expectations of the principal gives 
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1.3 OBJECTIVES 
The following are the objectives of the study: 
1. To identifY the uses offree cash flow, and 
2. To evaluate the usage offree cash flows. 
1.4 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS 
The study is laid out in five chapters. The first chapter sets the dimensions of the 
study. The second chapter reviews important works gennane to the study. The issues 
are addressed in a topical form. The third chapter highlights the measures to be used in 
the study and the structure of analysis. The fourth chapter discusses the results of the 
population categorised by control and growth. The fifth chapter discusses the findings 
arising from the pairings of low growth companies and high growth companies. The 
sixth chapter analyses the pairings of owner controlled companies on the one hand and 
manager controlled companies on the other hand. The final chapter provides 
concluding remarks. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 AGENCY THEORY 
Basically, the agency theory takes its roots from the relationship between shareholders 
and managers. In legal terminology it is referred to as a contract of agency. The 
parties to this contract are known as the principal and the agent. Applying this 
definition to the company setting, the principals are the shareholders and their agents 
are the managers. 
The agency theory came into being about twenty years ago through a ground breaking 
article by Jensen & Meckling (1976). Before then important contributions were made 
by Smith (1776), Berle & Means (1932), Coase (1937) and Alchian & Demsetz 
(1972) to describe the relationship between shareholders and managers. An overview 
of their contributions follows. Smith (1776) likens the role of managers to stewards 
and states that they cannot be expected to watch over their master's money with the 
same care as their own. Berle & Means (1932) report that the separation of 
ownership and control leaves shareholders effectively powerless. This is because 
shareholders are widely dispersed and cannot take any co-ordinated action against 
managers. Coase (1937) reiterates the master servant relationship but lays emphasis 
on the right to control the servant by the master or his appointed agent. Alchian & 
Demsetz (1972) define the firm as being made up of contracts between a central agent 
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is to weigh the outcomes they observe against their guesses about what would have 
happened ifmanagers had followed other strategies (Bhide 1994,133). 
The modem theory of the firm regards the company as a form of legal fiction which 
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships. The typical feature which derives from 
this contract is the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of 
companies (Jensen & Meckling 1976,87). Shareholders have a right to cash flows only 
when cash dividends are declared by directors. By implication, shareholders do not 
have a decisive right to the company's free cash flow. Consequently, shareholders are 
faced with potential variability of returns. The other participants in the corporate 
contract mostly receive a fixed return that is essentially determined by external market 
rates. However, this situation does not preclude them from seeking some sort of 
protection. Debt holders nonnally incorporate covenants and other special clauses in 
debt agreements to limit the cost of managerial discretion (Smith & Warner, 1979). 
This is because certain actions which favour shareholders affect debt holders adversely. 
For example, the payment of a large dividend decreases the assets available as security 
for debt holders to fall on in time of bankruptcy. 
Ownership structure may be affected by the size of companies. Size in turn may be a 
limiting factor on the degree of concentration of ownership. Ownership in companies 
with high market values is diffused among a wide spectrum of people (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985). All things being equa~ individual shareholders would not have large 
proportionate claims on dividends. This situation gives rise to what is termed the 'free 
rider problem'. This is a fundamental problem associated with the delegation of power 
from many to a few. In this case, from shareholders to managers. In this setting, a 
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2.2 DETERMINANTS OF AGENCY COSTS 
Some factors which influence agency costs are the tastes of managers, the ease with 
which they can exercise their own preferences as opposed to value maximisation in 
decision making and the costs of monitoring and bonding activities (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The costs of monitoring and bonding activities depend on the 
environment in which the company is operating. Firms which operate in environments 
characterised by stable prices, stable technology and stable market shares can be 
monitored at relatively low costs (Demsetz & Lehn 1985,1159). Managers are 
constrained by external forces and so have a narrow range of options. On the contrary, 
a highly volatile environment enhances managerial discretion and presents a formidable 
barrier to effective monitoring. Managers have a wide array of potential courses of 
action which might seem acceptable to shareholders. Therefore it is very difficult to 
differentiate between decisions that contribute positively to value creation and those 
that lead to value destruction. This situation underscores the amount of flexibility to 
be tolerated in monitoring strategi~s. 
2.3 CONTROL OF AGENCY COSTS 
Agency costs can be controlled by monitoring and bonding mechanisms. Monitoring 
mechanisms involve gathering information on the agent's efforts, on random external 
factors that may affect the success of the agent's effort and on the outcomes of the 
agent's activities. Bonding mechanisms represent a commitment by the agent to follow 
a predetermined course of action. These control procedures unavoidably involve cost 
in either monetary or non-monetary terms. 
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Monitoring costs are incurred by shareholders in the process of tracking and evaluating 
the actions of managers. Some components of this cost item are internal control 
systems, external auditor's fees and incentive compensation schemes for managers. 
Bonding costs on the other hand are those borne by managers to guarantee that their 
behaviour and actions are in the best interest of shareholders. An example of bonding 
mechanism is debt finance. Debt binds managers to make periodic payments of interest 
and principal to the providers of funds. Actually, it reduces the discretion of managers 
over free cash flow. It may also take the form of a pledge to abide by the code of 
ethics of the profession. In South Africa, the King Report makes recommendations on 
the responsibilities of directors, the role of auditors and the relationship between 
stakeholders and the company. It also deVelops a code of conduct and reports on the 
question of adoption and compliance by all interested parties (King Report 1994). 
Compliance with the provisions of the King Report can be regarded as a bonding 
mechanism. 
Jensen (1993,850) broadly classifies the mechanisms used to control agency costs into 
the following groups: 
• capital markets, 
• legal / political / regulatory system, 
• product and factor markets, and 
• internal control system headed by the board of directors. 
These mechanisms are discussed below in the South African context. 
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2.3.1 CAPITAL MARKETS 
The capital market is the source of long-tenn finance to companies. The players on 
this market monitor managerial decisions closely and by the interplay of demand and 
supply, the prices of shares re fixed. The accuracy of this valuation however depends 
on the efficiency of the market in pricing shares and other securities. The JSE is said 
to be operationally efficient although the degree to which it is efficient is still a matter 
of dispute (Bhana 1994,93-94). It is worthwhile to note that a relatively large number 
of shares are not traded regularly on the JSE (Bradfield 1989,23). This problem of 
thin trading is likely to distort the pricing of shares. Put differently, prices of shares 
lag considerably behind new information, thus reflecting information available at the 
last trading. 
Although companies do not derive direct monetary benefits from the trading of own 
shares on the stock exchange, the value of shares reflects the reaction of the 
investment community to the state of affairs ofcompanies. The discipline of the capital 
market comes in various ways. The most obvious way is when the company requires 
additional funding from the market. In such a situation the providers of capital, 
investment bankers, security analysts and the market in general have the opportunity 
to scrutinise the past performance of managers. Using that as a basis, they determine 
the price at which to offer additional finance. Easterbrook (1984) suggests that a high 
dividend payout is a means of reducing agency costs by assuring investors that the firm 
will subject itself to the discipline of the market in order to finance new projects. 
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Another fonn of control exercised by the capital market comes through takeovers. 
Jensen & Ruback (1983) refer to it as the market for corporate control in which 
management teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources. Managers 
who do not optimise the resources at their disposal are replaced by others who have 
better use for them. Shareholders take sides with the team which is able to deliver 
value maximising projects. Often, companies whose performance do not measure up 
to their potential are the targets of takeover activity. The natural response one can 
imagine is the motivation by managers to lead their companies towards optimal 
performance. 
It oUght to be noted that managers can erect barriers to takeovers in order to insulate 
themselves from the discipline of the outside market for control. Some of these tactics 
include poison pills, green mail and the so called 'golden 'parachutes' (Malatesta, Paul 
& Walking, 1988). Barr, Gerson & Kantor (1995, 26) observe that the hostile 
takeover is impossible in South Africa because the controllers of companies have 
succeeded in retaining a majority of the votes despite having less than simple majority 
of ownership claims. 
In the absence of hostile takeovers, friendly mergers are the near substitutes in South 
Africa. Bhana (1984) posits that most mergers consummated are in the direction of 
conglomeration. The reason underlying conglomeration is to gain monopolistic or 
oligopolistic control over industries. Incidentally, Afileck-Graves, Burt & Cleasby 
(1989) share the opinion that conglomerates under-performed non-conglomerates on 
the JSE. The disciplining role ofmergers is therefore blurred ifnot lost in this regard. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES 
Free cash flow can be used in various ways. It can be used to pay dividends, repay 
loans or be retained for the purpose of reinvestment in future projects. Ownership 
structure may affect the distribution of free cash flow among these competing needs. 
Ownership structure is defined by the distribution of shareholdings. If ownership is 
widely distributed, it is likely that no individual will have an interest large enough to 
influence management. But when ownership is highly concentrated, shareholders can 
exert more influence over management. 
The agency literature states that managerial stock ownership helps in aligning 
managerial interests with thos  of external stockholders. In view of this, it is 
proposed that there is an inverse relationship between agency costs of free cash flow 
and managerial ownership. To illustrate, the higher the shareholding of managers, the 
lower the potential of agency costs; and the lower the shareholding, ofmanagers, the 
higher the potential of agency costs. 
It is further proposed that companies with high investment opportunities would have a 
lower payout than those with low investment opportunities. Whereas low growth 
prospects suggest that companies have limited opportunities to re-invest free cash flow 
profitably, high growth prospects dictate the opposite. Payment of cash dividends 
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effectively reduces free cash flow under the control of managers. It is interesting to 
note that these same managers make decisions on the size of dividends. 
The use of free cash flows to finance future projects may differ across ownership 
structures. Owner controlled companies are likely to depend more on this source of 
finance than professionally managed companies. This is because the other ways of 
raising capital namely the issuing of additional shares and the borrowing of funds 
endanger the control of owners. If more shares are issued, it decreases the stake of 
majority shareholders if they are unable to exercise their rights. If debt finance is 
acquired, not only does it increase the risk profile of companies but it also allows for 
the tax shield benefits of debt. 
From the foregoing comments, the null hypothesis put forward is that: 
Ho: There are no differences in the use of free cash flows by owner 
controlled companies and professionally managed companies. 
The alternate hypothesis is: 
HI: There are differences in the use of free cash flows by owner 
controlled and professionally managed companies. 
To test the central hypothesis, it is necessary to establish sub-hypotheses. These 
complementary hypotheses will each address the three major areas of concern to this 
study: debt policy, investment of free cash flow and dividend policy. The first sub­
hypothesis put forward is: 
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duplication of results. But in some cases the demarcation between holding and 
operating companies were blurred by the cross holdings of controlling shareholders. 
Some discretion was exercised in this respect. Companies included under this 
condition are; Ventron, Mobile, Fraser Alexander and Storeco. 
The companies were categorised into two main groups, namely owner controlled 
companies and manager controlled companies. Owner controlled companies are 
companies whose majority voting rights lied in the hands of an individual, family or 
the board of directors. Manager controlled companies are companies whose majority 
voting rights did not rest with an individual or a group of persons, say families. It 
should be noted that majority of South African industrial companies are controlled by 
individuals, groups of associated businesses and large businesses (Savage 1985, 22). 
Barr et al (1995, 18) describe the control process thus: 
"(B)y means of pyramid holding companies - and also by way of 
cross shareholdings and voting trusts - founders or their families 
retain control over vast assets with ownership claims on them that can 
be less than 10%." 
Previous studies in South Africa used different proportions of shareholding to classifY 
companies. For example, Shung et al (1987, 7) defined family controlled companies 
as those in which at least 50% of issued shares are owned by individual families while 
Uliana (199 used the ownership of at least 20% of equity capital to classifY 
companies into three groups. The latter study identified significant differences in 
operational management and financial policies of these groups. These differences were 
evident even after controlling for industry and size effects. This indicates the ability to 
influence corporate decisions with a 20% shareholding. 
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Following Uliana (1991), the mark for identifYing owner controlled companies was 
the holding of a minimum of twenty per cent (20%) equity stake either by the 
owner/family or board of directors. All other companies which did not meet this 
criterion were deemed to be professionally managed. Ownership data was obtained 
from McGregor's "Who Owns Whom" (1993 & 1996). 
Owing to the varying degrees of growth potential of companies, a further 
classification of companies was necessary. The price to earnings (PIE) ratio was used 
as a benchmark for distinguishing between high growth companies and low growth 
companies [Firer (1994), Capaul, Rowley & Sharpe (1994, 28-29)]. Also the PIE 
ratio of the industrial sector of the JSE is reported among other things to be 
significantly correlated with growth proxies [Ward & Stathoulis,1994)]. All 
companies in the industrial sector (Appendix 1) were ranked according to the 
magnitude of their PIE ratios and the following practicable limits were decided upon. 
Companies with PIE ratios consistently below 10 for the period were considered as 
low growth companies and those with consecutive PIE ratios above 15 were deemed 
as high growth companies. The resultant sub-samples were; low growth owner 
controlled companies, low growth manager controlled companies, high growth owner 
controlled companies and high growth manager controlled companies. The average 
PIE of low growth and high growth companies for the sample period were 6.41 and 
23.25 respectively. 
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3.3 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
A total of one hundred and nine (109) companies were identified for the purpose of 
this study. The distribution of companies among owner controlled (low growth and 
high growth) and manager controlled (low growth and high growth) categories is 
shown in Table 3.1 (see list in Appendix 2). 
Table 3.1 
PODul 
A 
" f 
Type Low Growth High Growth Sample 
Owner controlled 35 16 51 
Manager controlled 28 30 58 
TOTAL 63 46 109 
From Table 3.1, the low growth group has the highest number of companies. Owner 
controlled companies occupied the highest and lowest positions in the low growth and 
high growth categories respectively. On the other hand manager controlled companies 
yielded almost the same number of companies across the groups. 
3.4 DATA COLLECTION 
Data on free cash flow was drawn from the annual statements of the companies. The 
Bureau of Financial Analysis Network (BFA-Net) served as the main database. The 
standardised format of financial statements presented in this database was used so as to 
eliminate differences caused by presentation and disclosure. Other sources of data are 
the JSE Monthly Bulletin and the annual publications of McGregors "Who Owns 
Whom." 
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FCFI is computed as follows: 
FCFI = CI X 100 
FCF 
where CI is cash invested (#718). 
FCFD is calculated as follows: 
FCFD = CD X 100 
FCF 
where CD is the sum of ordinary share dividends and preference share 
dividends (#715 & #716). 
Preference dividends are included in the numerator to conform to the spirit of the 
agency theory. The rights of preference shareholders in the residual return of a 
company are akin to those of ordinary shareholders. However it is not expected to 
influence the results significantly. Twenty-three (23) companies issued preference 
shares but a company retired its shares within the sample period. 
While it is of interest to analyse how FCF is used via these ratios, there is an implicit 
assumption in the formulae. That is all FCF is either paid out as dividends or invested. 
This is due to the difficulty in determining the sequence of events. In cases where cash 
invested or cash paid as dividends is greater than total FCF, it is not known whether 
cash was invested before dividends were paid or otherwise. For these reasons FCF is 
expressed as a proportion of both cash invested and cash dividends. 
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Logarithmic transformation was chosen for this study. This method of transformation 
however has the disadvantage of not being applicable to negative and zero values. 
Since the dividend payout included zero values, this transformation was not 
applicable. The ratios were transformed in two ways. First, for ratios bounded 
between zero and infinity, the log of the ratio was taken. This was applicable to the 
FCFD and FCFI. Second, ratios bounded between zero and one were transformed by 
log[ratio/l-ratio] (Hawkins & Weber 1980, 414). These are total debt to total assets 
and long-term debt to total assets. MY A was not transformed because in the strict 
sense it does not satisfy the proportionality assumption underlying ratios. 
The Shapiro-Wilk test was applied to the groups to determine whether the data follow 
a normal distribution. This test was chosen because it is an effective test for normality 
for small samples such as we have in this study (Shapiro & Wilk, 1968). The test was 
applied to the transformed values for debt ratios and FCF ratios and raw values for 
dividend payout and MY A. The results of the test are produced in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 
Results of Shapiro-Wilk Test 
Ratios Low 
Owner 
High 
Owner 
Low 
Manager 
High 
Manager 
Total Debt/Total Assets 0.9841 0.9554 0.9729 0.9294 
LT Debt/Total Assets 0.9852 0.8960 0.9700 0.9862 
Dividend Payout 0.8905 0.9501 0.9534 0.9821 
FCFI 0.9519 0.9678 0.9658 0.9538 
FCFD 0.9586 0.9461 0.9405 0.9828 
MYA 0.6148* 0.3983* 0.8542* 0.7142* 
*Normality rejected at 5% significance level 
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Another limitation of the study is the inability to capture the discretionary investment 
opportunities of companies and the cash spent on them A way to get around this 
problem (as suggested in Section 3.5) was to take the global amount spent on 
investments for the analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 

EFFECT OF CONTROL STRUCTURES AND GROWTH ON 

FINANCIAL POLICIES 

4.1 CONTROL STRUCTURES AND DEBT POLICY 
The role of debt in curbing agency costs of FCF cannot be overemphasised. To 
recapitulate, debt pre-commits managers to payout FCF in the form of interest 
payments and loan repayments. In view of this, companies that have a significant 
proportion of debt should incur lower agency costs of FCF than companies without 
this source of finance. The hypothesis to be examined in this vein is that the debt 
policy of owner controlled companies do not differ from that of manager controlled 
companies. 
The measures to be used in this analysis are the total debt to total assets ratio and the 
long-term debt to total assets ratio. The comparison of the means are depicted in box 
and whisker plots in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. Table 4.1 reports some descriptive 
statistics and results of the t-test on the debt policies of owner controlled and manager 
controlled companies. 
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Table 4.1 

Debt Policies of Owner Controlled and Manager Controlled Companies 

Count Mean Std 95% Confidence t-stat p 
Error Interval value 
Total Debt/Total Assets: 
Owner 51 46.20 2.58 41.02 51.39 
Manager 58 48.14 1.86 44.36 51.91 -0.75 0.45 
LT Debt/Total Assets: 
Owner 51 9.05 1.79 5.44 12.65 
Manager 58 7.28 1.42 4.44 10.11 0.89 0.38 
The box and whisker plots present contrasting positions for the two ratios of owner 
and manager controlled companies. Figure 4.1 reveals that manager controlled 
companies assume a higher proportion of debt than owner controlled companies. 
Figure 4.2 however shows that manager controlled companies assume a lower 
proportion of long-term debt than owner controlled companies. There is an overlap in 
both ratios for the groups so some similarity exists. 
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4.2 CONTROL STRUCTURES AND INVESTMENT POLICY 
This section aims at identifYing differences in the proportion of FCF invested and the 
economic value added by owner and manager controlled companies to the investment 
of shareholders. Analysis will be conducted via two measures, FCFI and MY A. The 
hypothesis to be tested is whether or not owner and manager controlled companies 
invest same proportions ofFCF. 
4.2.1 Free Cash Flow Invested 
The box and whisker plots are shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 and the Table 4.2 provides 
a summary of the descriptive statistics and the results of the t-test. 
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4.2.2 Market Value Added 
Box and whisker plots are shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 and descriptive statistics in 
Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 

Descriptive Statistics for Owner and Manager Controlled Companies 

Market Value Added 

Statistics Owner Manager 
Count 51 58 
Mean 448.17 295.33 
Median 149.66 150.57 
Standard Error 120.42 52.37 
Quartile Range 434.08 388.84 
Lower Quartile 11.39 32.66 
Upper Quartile 445.47 421.59 
Minimum -88.22 -69.79 
Maximum 4098.39 1657.14 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
u-stat 1465.00 
p-value 0.930 
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4.3.1 Free Cash Flow for Dividends 
The box and whisker plots are reported in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 and the descriptive 
statistics are listed in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 

Descriptive Statistics for Owner and Manager Controlled Companies 

Free Cash Flow for Dividends 

Statistics Owner Manager 
Count 30 43 
Mean 39.43 29.93 
Median 26.46 26.26 
Standard Error 7.49 2.62 
Quartile Range 30.10 21.59 
Lower Quartile 18.09 18.41 
Upper Quartile 48.19 40.00 
T-TEST 
t-stat -0.24 
p-value 0.81 
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Table 4.5 
Descriptive Statistics for Owner and Manager Controlled Companies 

Dividend Payout 

Statistics Owner Manager I 
Count 50 56 
Mean 31.57 33.20 
Median 29.45 30.96 
Standard Error 3.11 1.93 
Lower Quartile 17.48 22.45 
Upper Quartile 42.11 42.92 
Quartile Range 24.63 20.48 
T-TEST 
t-stat -0.45 
p-value 0.65 
I 
The box and whisker plots reveal that manager controlled companies pay almost the 
same portion of earnings as dividends like owner controlled companies. From Table 
4.5, the means of owner controlled and manager controlled companies are 31.57% 
and 33.20% respectively. Also, the overlap in the spread of the boxes (Figures 4.9 & 
4.10) shows that both groups have similar payout percentages. 
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4.5 GROWTH AND DEBT POLICY 
The comparison of low growth to high growth companies should provide a ground for 
identifying differences arising from the growth factor as explained in Section 3.1. The 
hypothesis to be examined is that low growth and high growth companies carry same 
proportions of debt. The data for total debt to total assets are depicted in Figure 4.11 
and long-term debt to total assets in Figure 4.12. Some descriptive statistics and the 
results of the t-test are produced in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6 
Debt Policies of Low Growth and High Growth Companies 
Count Mean Std 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
t-stat p 
value 
Total Debt/Total Assets: 
Low Growth 63 47.21 2.08 43.06 51.37 
High Growth 46 47.26 2.40 42.42 52.10 0.15 0.88 
LT Debt/Total Assets: 
Low Growth 63 7.46 1.44 4.59 10.34 
High Growth 46 8.98 1.81 5.34 12.62 -0.58 0.56 
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Chapter 4 Effect of Growth on Financial Policies 
4.6 GROWTH AND INVESTMENT POLICY 
It is expected that growth prospects will affect the investment of FCF and 
consequently the level of returns on investment. The investment policies of low 
growth and high growth companies as represented by FCFI and MYA are discussed in 
this section. The hypothesis in this regard is that low growth and high growth 
companies invest same proportions ofFCF. 
4.6.1 Free Cash Flow Invested 
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 display the box and whisker plots of low growth and high 
growth companies. Table 4.7 reports the summary statistics. 
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4.6.2 Market Value Added 
The box and whisker plots comparing low growth companies to high growth 
companies are depicted in Figure 4. 15 and 4. 16. A table of descriptive statistics 
follows in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8 
Descriptive Statistics for Low and High Growth Companies 

Market Value Added 

Statistics Low High 
Count 63 46 
Mean 492.08 195.32 
Median 234.78 49.48 
Standard Error .93 .73 69.59 
Quartile Range 596.61 165 .69 
Lower Quartile 46.58 12.94 
Upper Quartile 643 .19 178.63 
Minimum -72.84 -88.23 
Maximum 4098.39 3005.97 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
u-stat 936.00 
p-value 0.00 
-­ -­ -
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4.7 GROWTH AND DIVIDEND POLICY 
The relationship between growth and dividend policy is investigated in this section. 
Dividend theory suggests that companies which require funding for superior 
investment opportunities should not pay dividends. The reason is to conserve cash for 
investment purposes. F or instance a high growth company is not expected to 
distribute FCF as much as a low growth company. The null hypothesis put forward 
here is that the dividend policies of such companies are similar. 
4.7.1 Free Cash Flow for Dividends 
The percentage of FCF paid as dividends by low growth and high growth companies 
are compared in box and whisker plots in Figures 4.17 and 4.18 and the descriptive 
statistics are listed in Table 4.9. 
FIgIP 1.11 Mean Plats FIgII1I.18 Median Plats 

LWI GnMh nI H" GroNh LWI GroNh and High GlOICh 

Free Cash FDt III' DMdends Free Cash FDt for DMdends 

~ rl ----------------------------------------' ~ r'----------------------------------~ 
50 228 
15 

1110 

10 
~IIO~ell o 
I&.. I&.. 
0100~ I&..30 ' . 

60 

25 
20 ~ I ' I20 ' . 
g ' ~ .~ ~I----------------------------------------~ 
lWlGlOICh HighGlOICh LWlGroNh H" GroNh 
T)1)e T)1)e 
56 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
.....UiilUlCl 4 Effect of Growth on Financial Policies 
Descriptive Low and High 
Flow for Dividends 
lUI 
t~stat 
It is irmne(nalel 17 and 4.18 growth a 
as Low 
"'VJ,ulJ.....~,~u have a mean 
companies. a lower H1"' ........"'1 
as inspection spread of 
"'....;YL-'''' provides some U\;~i:Ul;). is 
50% which that majority of pay Onlv a 
as GiVlaenas. 
of the t-test are shown is at 
finding that growth Dav a 
comparues is This is not with 
"~I'1"lnn 3.1" has not 
to a suitable ofthese it is 
57 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
Chapter 4 Effect of Growth on Financial Policies 
FCFD and dividend payout is easy to make. A look at dividend payout in tandem with 
FCFD should provide a clearer picture on this issue. 
4.7.2 Dividend Payout 
Box and whisker plots comparing low growth to high growth companies are presented 
in Figures 4.19 and 4.20 while Table 4.10 provides a list of descriptive statistics. 
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Table 4.10 
Descriptive Statistics for Low and High Growth Companies 

Dividend Pavout 

Statistics Low High 
Count 60 46 
Mean 29.69 35.10 
Median 27.94 34.41 
Standard Error 2.49 2.43 
Lower Quartile 17.59 24.20 
Upper Quartile 36.18 45.47 
Quartile Range 18.59 21.27 
T-TEST 
t-stat -1.78 
p-value 0.08 
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CHAPTER FIVE 

EFFECT OF CONTROL STRUCTURES ON THE FINANCIAL 

POLICIES OF LOW GROWTH COMPANIES AND 

HIGH GROWTH COMPANIES 

5.1 DEBT POLICY OF LOW GROWTH COMPANIES 
The hypothesis to be examined in this vein is that the debt policies of low growth 
owner controlled companies and low growth manager controlled companies do not 
differ. As indicated in Section 3.1, the comparison of low growth companies should 
provide a common ground for identification of differences arising from control 
structures. 
5.1.1 Total Debt to Total Assets 
The box and whisker plots for low growth owner controlled companies and low 
growth manager controlled companies are depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
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Chapter 5 Effect of Control Structures on Low Growth Companies 
The t-test does not reveal any significant difference in the levels of debt adopted by 
these companies. In aggregate both groups seem to apply the same proportion of debt 
but the marginally wider spread of manager controlled companies suggests that they 
contract varying levels ofdebt. 
5.1.2 Long-term Debt to Total Assets 
The mean plots of low growth owner controlled companies and low growth manager 
controlled companies are depicted in Figure 5.3 and the median plots are shown in 
Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.3 shows that low growth owner controlled companies take on more long-term 
debt than low growth manager controlled companies. The median of the owner 
controlled group is slightly larger than the median of the manager controlled group, 
but the two distributions overlap substantially. Actually majority of the companies 
have very low ratios. By inspection, 75% of the companies in each group have ratios 
below 10% (Figure 5.4). But above the upper quartile, owner controlled companies 
display a greater variability than manager controlled companies. This perhaps hints at 
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Chapter 5 Effect of Control Structures on Low Growth Companies 
The t-statistic of 1.81 which gives a p-value of 0.08 does not reveal any significant 
difference in the long-term debt position of both groups. The null hypothesis is 
therefore accepted 
5.2 INVESTMENT POLICY OF LOW GROWTH COMPANIES 
This section deals with the investment policy of low growth owner controlled 
companies and low growth manager controlled companies. Low growth companies 
are assumed to have few investment opportunities so they are not expected to expend 
high proportions of FCF in this respect. This pairing places the categories on equal 
grounds so any difference identified could be attributed to control structures. 
5.2.1 Free Cash Flow Invested 
The box and whisker plots of low growth owner controlled companies and low growth 
manager controlled companies are shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, and Table 5.3 
provides a list ofdescriptive statistics for both groups. 
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Table 5.3 
Descriptive Statistics for Low Growth Companies 

Free Cash Flow Invested 

Statistics 
Count 18 19 
Mean 106.65 94.05 
Median 98.93 71.10 
Standard Error 17.25 18.35 
Lower Quartile 64.47 47.09 
Upper Quartile 117.51 125.98 
Quartile Range 53.04 78.89 
Skewness 2.14 2.72 
Kurtosis 6.21 9.42 
T-TEST 
t-stat 0.80 
p-value 0.43 
There is little difference between the mean and median for both groups. The means are 
106.65% and 94.05% for low growth owner and low growth manager controlled 
companies respectively. But the medians are not so close. They are 98.93% for low 
growth owner controlled group and 71.10% for low growth manager controlled group. 
The median plots show that low growth owner controlled companies invest almost the 
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Chapter 5 Effect of Control Structures on Low Growth Companies 
same proportions of FCF while low growth manager controlled companies invest 
varying percentages of FCF. This is illustrated by the quartile range of both groups. 
The quartile range of 53.04% for low growth owner controlled companies is smaller 
than 78.89% for low growth manager controlled companies. 
As has been implied by the box and whisker plots, the t-test does not reveal any 
significant difference in the proportion ofFCF invested. The similarity of both groups 
stresses the role of the growth factor in the utilisation ofFCF. This is confirmed by the 
fact that most companies invest less than 100% of FCF. Thus suggesting that these 
companies do not borrow funds to finance dwindling investment opportunities. 
5.2.2 Market Value Added 
The comparison of both groups is shown in the box and whisker plots (Figures 5.7 & 
5.8). Table 5.4 reports the descriptive statistics. 
FtgnS.7I11i11f\:is Rgre ~811!dal f\:is 
lDIYQtWh~ lDIYQvojh~ 
Mir1IIitVUMJlj 101m!vuMJIj 
r---------------- -------------,9OO ,r---------------------------------------, ~ i ---­
3500750 
1 
 2500
all t 
 ~ 
o 
« ~ 1500t~ 
I 
 500
:m I : J~ 
l~Li --------------------------------------~ ~ iL--------------------------------------------" 
IMler Io'a1igIJ IMler Io'a1igIJ 
Type Type 
67 

Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
memaD plots 
'-'VJLLlj-J,.,.uI"''' is a 
for Low Growth 
Market Value Added 
Ii~ 
1 
MVA 
IS owner ",.,."1'...,.,. 
controlled 
groups 
IHQ.lI.a5"'1 
that companies. Low growth llJ.allQo~;;a 
controlled have a higher to 
owner "Aft....." it means is 
higher more growth owner f'",n'tr" 
test is no ;:)l!';J.lllll.<i1I the Pl'nnn1Tlll' 
justification 
1nanlt::s by Dotentlal as groups seem to rated 
68 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
Chapter 5 -Effect ofControl Structures on Low Growth Companies 
5.3 DIVIDEND POLICY OF LOW GROWTH COMPANIES 
The dividend policy of low growth owner controlled companies and low growth 
manager controlled companies are compared in this section. In such companies the 
avenues for profitable investments are limited. If this situation persists then the 
objective of shareholder wealth maximisation dictates that surplus cash be returned to 
the owners of the company. 
5.3.1 Free Cash Flow for Dividends 
Low growth owner controlled companies and low growth manager controlled 
companies are compared in box and whisker plots in Figures 5.9 and 5.10. The 
descriptive statistics of both groups are listed in Table 5.5. 
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Chapter 5 Effect of Control Structures on Low Growth Companies 
5.3.2 Dividend Payout 
The box and whisker plots are presented in Figures 5.11 and 5.12. Table 5.6 reports 
the descriptive statistics for both groups and the results of the t-test. 
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Table 5.6 
Descriptive Statistics for Low Growth Companies 
Dividend P 
. 
Statistics Owner Manager 
34 26 
Mean 
Count 
28.70 30.10 
Median 28.93 26.99 
Standard Error 3.16 
Lower Quartile 
3.71 
13.64 18.59 
Upper Quartile 36.42 33.99 
IQuartile Range 22.78 15.40 
Skewness 1.20 
Kurtosis 
1.55 
4.84 0.66 
T-TEST 
t-stat -0.45 
p-value 0.65 
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5.5 DEBT POLICY OF HIGH GROWTH COMPANIES 
Funds for investment could be obtained from retained earnings. But they may be 
inadequate in financing new projects. For that matter it is expected that high growth 
companies would carry relatively large debt burdens to achieve their full potential. The 
hypothesis to be tested here is that the proportions of debt contracted by high growth 
owner controlled companies and high growth manager controlled companies are not 
different. 
5.5.1 Total Debt to Total Assets 
Figure 5.13 displays the mean plots of both types of high growth companies and Figure 
5.14 shows the median plots. 
F~e5.13MmPlols F9n 5.14 Median Plots 
tigl Groo1h ~ High Growth Co~rjos 
TotlI Debt to TotlI Assets T0lIl1 Debt mTolal Assets 
56 . gl 90 . . 1 8052 ~.a _70 ~ !l ~60
'".. ~~ I.. I I <44 § .!!!0 ~f­
£~ £40 
:c E Q) ~'U~36 I !! ~. ~0 f­ 32 10 
28 0 
Owner Mirlager Owner Manager 
TypeType 
It is evident from the box and whisker plots that high growth manager controlled 
companies are clearly distinguished from high growth owner controlled companies in 
terms of debt policy (Figures 5.13 & 5.14). Manager controlled companies finance a 
larger proportion of assets through debt than owner controlled companies. As is 
apparent in the mean plots, there is only a little overlap within the 95% confidence 
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5.5.2 Long-term Debt to Total Assets 
The box and whisker plots for high growth owner controlled companies and high 
growth manager controlled companies are presented in Figures 5.15 and 5.16. 
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The common characteristics observed in the distribution is the dominance of low ratios 
(Figure 5.16). For example the proportion of assets financed with long-tenn debt in 
75% ofmanager controlled companies is under 10%. Figure 5.16 also reveals that half 
of owner controlled companies have very low ratios as compared to the same 
proportion of manager controlled companies. This can be seen from the bottom half of 
the plot of owner controlled companies. The overlap of the mean and median plot 
suggests that both groups adopt similar proportions of long-tenn debt. Generally, 
long-tenn debt can be described as a less important source of finance in these 
companies. Table 5.8 presents the descriptive statistics for the groups. 
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5.6 INVESTMENT POLICY OF HIGH GROWTH COMPANIES 
Following the same rationale as in Section 5.2, high growth owner and high growth 
manager controlled companies are examined in this section. It is envisaged that 
managers of these companies would want to conserve cash for re-investment. The 
hypothesis put forward in this direction is that the proportions ofFCF invested by high 
growth owner controlled companies and high growth manager controlled companies 
are similar. 
5.6.1 Free Cash Flow Invested 
Figures 5.17 and 5.18 display the box and whisker plots of high growth owner 
controlled companies and high growth manager controlled companies respectively. 
Table 5.9 provides a list ofdescriptive statistics for both groups. 
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Table 5.9 
Descriptive Statistics for High Growth Companies 

Free Cash Flow Invested 

Statistics Owner Manager 
Count 12 24 
Mean 109.51 114.61 
Median 102.56 97.53 
Standard Error 22.58 14.47 
Lower Quartile 46.48 58.61 
Upper Quartile 161.50 134.74 
Quartile Range 115.03 76.13 
Skewness 0.31 1.91 
Kurtosis -0.63 4.79 
T-TEST 
t-stat -1.35 
p-value 0.19 
~ 
The box and whisker plots indicate that high growth manager controlled companies 
invest more ofFCF than high growth owner controlled companies. The mean FCFI of 
the manager controlled group is 114.61 % and that of the owner controlled group is 
109.51 %. The fact that manager controlled companies are not as widely dispersed as 
owner controlled companies shows that they invest similar proportions of FCF. This 
characteristic is reflected by the comparatively low quartile range of 76.13% recorded 
by the manager controlled group as against 115.03% of the owner controlled group. 
As seen in Section 5.5, manager controlled companies tend to finance growth through 
debt and it follows that they should make investments in excess of FCF generated 
internally. This is exactly the case as the ratios of manager controlled companies are 
generally higher than those of owner controlled companies. To illustrate, the lower 
quartile of manager controlled companies is 58.61 % as against 46.48% of owner 
controlled companies. 
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The p-value of 0.19 reported by the t-test does not indicate any significant difference in 
the investment of FCF of these groups. Both groups of companies seem to be 
investing large proportions ofFCF so it could be inferred that agency costs ofFCF are 
low. Since almost one half of companies in each group invest more than FCF 
obtained, it is imperative that they depend on external sources of finance. The 
presence of debt therefore is likely to prevent managers from misusing FCF. 
5.6.2 Market Value Added 
The box and whisker plots are depicted in Figures 5.19 and 5.20. Table 5.10 lists 
some descriptive statistics for high growth owner controlled companies and high 
growth manager controlled companies. 
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Table 5.10 

Descriptive Statistics for High Growth Companies 

Market Value Added 

Statistics Owner Manager 
Count 16 30 
Mean 246.59 167.98 
Median 19.34 71.68 
Standard Error 186.52 43.01 
Quartile Range 128.76 154.81 
Lower Quartile 0.29 28.30 
Upper Quartile 129.06 183.11 
Minimum -88.22 -36.62 
Maximum 3005.97 978.77 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
u-stat 167.00 
p-value 0.09 
The median plots (Figure 5.20) reveal some overlapping in MV A but it is important to 
take note of the following. The quartile range of 128.78% for owner controlled 
companies is lower than that of manager controlled companies. Although the spread is 
almost the same in the median plots, both groups have quite different medians. Owner 
controlled companies have a median of 19.34% as against 71.68% of manager 
controlled companies. A greater percentage of owner controlled companies destroy 
value than manager controlled companies. This can be seen from the stretch of the 
minimum point to the lower quartile in Figure 5.20. These are not clearly shown in the 
diagram due to extreme observations. 
The major difference in medians perhaps points to the success of managerial discretion 
over the investment policies of companies. In the first place, manager controlled 
companies invest a greater portion of FCF than owner controlled companies. Apart 
from the benefits shareholders derive from the appreciation of their investments, 
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professional managers also enjoy immense benefits from the increased market value of 
the company. While Jensen (1989) notes that it enhances the power and status of 
managers, Barker, Jensen & Murphy (1988) contend that it enhances the 
remuneration of managers. 
The test of significance does not report a significant difference at the level of 5%, (p = 
0.09) between the MY A of both groups. This finding diminishes the importance of 
the proposition that owners who are also principals will safeguard the interests of 
stakeholders by achieving high economic values. 
5.7 DIVIDEND POLICY OF HIGH GROWTH COMPANIES 
The investment opportunities of high growth companies are likely to put a strain on 
FCF. For that matter, these companies may not pay dividends. But when control is 
introduced into this argument then dividend policy can be parted on this ground. 
Owner managers would want to maintain control over assets so they may not deplete 
FCF through dividend payments. This is because the more they deplete FCF, the 
more likely it is that they will require additional finance which may dilute their interest. 
5.7.1 Free Cash Flow for Dividends 
The box and whisker plots of high growth owner controlled companies and high 
growth manager controlled companies are presented in Figures 5.21 and 5.22 and 
Table 5.11 lists some descriptive statistics. 
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Table 5.11 
Descriptive Statistics for High Growth Companies 

Free Cash Flow for Dividends 

Statistics Owner Manager 
Count 12 24 
Mean 56.49 31.42 
Median 36.73 29.15 
Standard Error 16.37 2.67 
Lower Quartile 23.23 20.86 
Upper Quartile 70.90 38.95 
Quartile Range 47.68 18.09 
Skewness 2.57 1.13 
Kurtosis 7.43 1.63 
T-TEST 
t-stat 1.83 
p-value 0.08 
The box and whisker plots reveal a marked difference in the payout of FCF between 
high growth owner controlled companies and high growth manager controlled 
companies. Contrary to speculation, high growth owner controlled companies release 
more surplus cash to shareholders than high growth manager controlled companies. 
The mean and median of the owner controlled group are 56.49% and 36.73% whilst 
those of the manager controlled group are 31.42% and 25.88% respectively. On the 
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other hand, manager controlled companies display a very close quartile range of 
18.09% as against 47.68% for owner controlled companies. It is evident from the 
lower and upper quartiles of manager controlled companies that they retain a high 
proportion of FCF. These companies pay between approximately 21 % and 39% of 
FCF. 
The t-test does not reveal any significant difference in the level of FCF paid out by 
these groups. The reported t-stat is 1.83 and the p-value is 0.08. The retention of 
FCF by managers is in line with the proposition by Easterbrook (1984) that managers 
may not want to subject themselves to the scrutiny of capital markets when in need of 
additional funds. But owner managers payout a larger proportion of FCF and this 
exemplifies the willingness of owner managers to undergo the scrutiny of the capital 
market. 
What is not clear at this juncture is why owner controlled companies would prefer 
external sources of finance to the internal alternative of retention. For example new 
equity issues are a relatively expensive source of capital as dividends are paid out from 
after tax income, and additional tax liability in the form of STC is imposed on the 
company. However, it is possible that owners are drawing benefits from their 
companies in the form ofcash dividends. 
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5.7.2 Dividend Payout 
The payout of both high growth owner controlled companies and high growth manager 
controlled companies are compared in box and whisker plots in Figures 5.23 and 5.24. 
Table 5.12 lists the descriptive statistics for the groups. 
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Table 5.12 
Descriptive Statistics for High Growth Companies 

Dividend Payout 

Statistics Owner Manager 
Count 16 30 
Mean 37.68 35.10 
Median 31.40 36.08 
Standard Error 5.56 2.35 
Lower Quartile 24.00 26.63 
Upper Quartile 52.45 43.93 
Quartile Range 28.45 17.30 
Skewness 0.47 -0.21 
Kurtosis -0.47 -0.20 
T-TEST 
t-stat 0.50 
p-value 0.62 
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To very a large extent, high growth owner controlled companies and high growth 
manager controlled companies have similar dividend payout ratios. This is the 
situation presented by the box and whisker plots (Figures 5.23 & 5.24). The means of 
high growth owner controlled companies and high growth manager controlled 
companies are 37.68% and 35.10% respectively. High growth manager controlled 
companies seem to have fairly close payout ratios. This can be seen from the quartile 
range of 17.30% as opposed to 28.45% for high growth owner controlled companies. 
The t-test results confirm the observation that there is no significant difference in the 
payout of high growth owner controlled companies and high growth manager 
controlled companies. Control structures do not seem to affect the payout policies of 
the companies. 
5.8 SUMMARY 
In a large measure, high growth manager controlled companies exhibit a greater 
dependence on debt tha  high growth owner controlled companies. From the above, 
it was expected that high growth manager controlled companies would make higher 
investments than their counterpart owner controlled companies. However, both 
groups display no significant difference in FCFI. The groups are quite different in 
terms of MYA. Manager controlled companies add higher values than owner 
controlled companies. The FCF paid out by the owner controlled group is slightly 
higher than the payout of the manager controlled group. This indicates the 
preparedness of owner managers to raise additional capital on the market. But this is 
not supported by the debt policy of owner controlled companies. 
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EFFECT OF GROWTH ON THE FINANCIAL POLICIES OF OWNER 

CONTROLLED COMPANIES AND MANAGER CONTROLLED 

COMPANIES 

6.1 DEBT POLICY OF OWNER CONTROLLED COMPANIES 
Owner controlled companies are assumed to have a common attitude to debt so they 
are isolated in this section to investigate the impact of growth on debt policies. It is 
hoped that any difference arising from this comparison will be traced to the different 
levels of growth. The hypothesis in this regard is that low growth owner controlled 
companies and high growth owner controlled companies assume the same proportions 
ofdebt. 
6.1.1 Total Debt to Total Assets 
Figure 6.1 displays the mean plots of the groups and Figure 6.2 presents the median 
plots. Table 6.1 reports the descriptive statistics for low growth owner controlled 
companies and high growth owner controlled companies. 
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Descriptive Statistics for Owner Controlled Companies 

Total Debt to Total Assets 

Statistics Low High 
Count 35 16 
Mean 48.13 41.98 
Median 49.67 42.02 
Standard Error 2.80 5.50 
Lower Quartile 33.64 28.02 
Upper Quartile 56.48 57.14 
Quartile Range 22.84 29.12 
Skewness 0.23 0.12 
Kurtosis -0.42 -0.49 
T-TEST 
t-stat 1.33 
p-value 0.19 
The mean and median of low growth owner controlled companies are higher than 
those of high growth owner controlled companies. The means are 48.13% and 
41.98% for low growth and high growth companies respectively. The low growth 
group median of 49.67% is slightly higher than the high growth group median of 
42.02%. The most noticeable feature of the box and whisker plots is the smaller 
spread of low growth owner controlled companies. The quartile range of 22.84% is 
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smaller than the quartile range of high growth companies, that is 29.12%. It must be 
noted that the lower quartile oflow growth owner controlled companies is 33.64% and 
is also slightly higher than 28.02% for high growth companies. This in itself suggests 
that majority of low growth companies assume high proportions of debt. The t-test 
does not report any significant difference in the debt policy of these two groups. The 
p-value of 0.19 shows that the results are not necessarily explained by the growth 
factor. 
6.1.2 Long-term Debt to Total Assets 
The long-term debt ratios of both groups are compared in box and whisker plots in 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4. Table 6.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the two categories. 
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Table 6.2 

Descriptive Statistics for Owner Controlled Companies 

Long-term Debt to Total Assets 

Statistics 
Count 
Mean 
Median 
Standard Error 
Lower Quartile 
Upper Quartile 
Quartile Range 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Low 
35 
8.95 
4.17 
2.34 
1.05 
10.20 
9.15 
3.02 
10.19 
High 
16 
9.25 
2.91 
2.63 
0.30 
18.25 
17.95 
0.87 
-0.28 
I 
I 
T-TEST 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.57 
0.57 
The mean of both groups are very close. These are 8.95% for low growth owner 
controlled companies and 9.25% for high growth owner controlled companies. The 
median plots (Figure 6.4) however reveal 50% of companies in both groups assume 
low proportions of debt, that is below the median. Low growth companies and high 
growth companies have median ratios of4.17% and 2.91 % respectively. 
The t-test confirms that the level of long-term debt assumed by low growth owner 
controlled companies is not significantly different from that of high growth companies. 
On this basis, therefore, no distinction can be made between the proportions of long-
term debt adopted by the groups. The growth factor therefore fails to bring a clear 
distinction between the proportion of assets financed by long-term debt. 
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6.2 INVESTMENT POLICY OF OWNER CONTROLLED COMPANIES 
The rationale of this section is to identify how growth levels affect the investment of 
FCF by owner controlled companies. Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested is that the 
level of FCF invested by low growth owner controlled companies and high growth 
owner controlled companies are similar. 
6.2.1 Free Cash Flow Invested 
The box and whisker plots of low growth and high growth owner controlled 
companies are depicted in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, and Table 6.3 provides a list of 
descriptive statistics for both groups. 
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Table 6.3 
Descriptive Statistics for Owner Controlled Companies 

Free Cash Flow Invested 

Statistics Low High 
Count 18 12 
Mean 106.65 109.51 
Median 98.93 102.20 
Standard Error 17.26 22.58 
Lower Quartile 64.47 46.48 
Upper Quartile 117.51 161.50 
Quartile Range 53.04 115.03 
Skewness 2.14 0.31 
Kurtosis 6.21 -0.63 
T-TEST 
t-stat 0.86 
p-value 0.40 
It is notable that almost 50% of the companies in both groups make investments 
beyond the level of FCF (Figure 6.6). That is FCFI above 100%. This presupposes 
that these companies use debt to finance investments. The similarity in FCFI is 
underscored by the closeness of the means and medians. Low growth owner 
controlled companies have a mean of 106.65% and high growth owner controlled 
companies have a mean of 109.51%. For the medians, they are 98.93% and 102.56% 
for low growth and high growth owner controlled companies respectively. 
The box and whisker plots show a major overlap between the two groups. As 
expected though, high growth companies invested slightly higher proportion of FCF 
than low growth companies. The upper quartile of 161.50% for high growth 
companies as against 117.51 % for low growth companies clarifies this point. But the 
difference observed is not significant (p=OAO) at the 95% confidence level. 
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6.2.2 Market Value Added 
Box and whisker plots for low growth and high growth owner controlled companies 
are depicted in Figures 6.7 and 6.8. Table 6.4 provides some descriptive statistics. 
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Table 6.4 

Descriptive Statistics for Owner Controlled Companies 

Market Value Added 

Statistics Low High 
Count 35 16 
Mean 540.33 246.59 
Median 234.78 19.34 
Standard Error 152.52 186.52 
Quartile Range 567.32 128.78 
Lower Quartile 36.68 0.29 
Upper Quartile 604.00 129.06 
Minimum -72.84 -88.22 
Maximum 4098.39 3005.97 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
u-stat 154.00 
p-value 0.01 
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Table 6.5 
Descriptive Statistics for Owner Controlled Companies 
Free Cash Flow for Dividends 
Statistics Low High 
12 
Mean 
Count 18 
28.07 56.49 
Median 24.44 36.73 
Standard Error 4.97 16.37 
Lower Quartile 14.93 23.23 
Upper Quartile 31.42 70.90 
Quartile Range 16.49 47.68 
Skewness 1.42 2.57 
Kurtosis 1.78 7.43 
T-TEST 
t-stat -2.23 
p-value 0.03 
It can be seen from Figures 6.9 and 6.10 that high growth owner controlled companies 
pay a greater proportion of FCF as dividends than low growth owner controlled 
companies. The mean of high growth companies which is 56.49% is far greater than 
the mean of28.07% recorded for low growth companies. In like manner, the median 
plots reveal that most low growth companies payout only a small fraction of FCF as 
dividends. Whereas the middle 50% of low growth companies pay between 14.93% 
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and 31% of FCF, the corresponding range of high growth companies is 23.23% to 
70.90%. 
It can also be observed from the median plots that all low growth owner controlled 
companies do not pay dividends beyond the level ofFCF obtained. Upon the basis of 
the t-stat of -2.23 and the associated p-value of 0.03, the difference in FCFD is 
significant at the level of 5%. That is high growth companies pay a greater percentage 
of FCF than low growth companies. A possible reason is that the PIE ratio is an 
insufficient measure for gauging growth. 
6.3.2 Dividend Payout 
The box and whisker plots comparing low growth and high growth owner controlled 
companies are shown in Figures 6.11 and 6.12 and Table 6.6 reports the associated 
descriptive statistics. 
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6.4 SUMMARY 
Low growth owner controlled companies take on similar proportions of debt as high 
growth owner controlled companies. Also, the proportion of FCF invested across the 
groups is quite similar. This raises the question of how low growth companies utilised 
the borrowed funds. The suspicion that managers of low growth companies may be 
investing in negative NPV projects was not sustained because they achieved higher 
MY A for shareholders. Surprisingly, the percentage of FCF paid out by high growth 
companies is greater than the payout of low growth companies. This finding implies 
that managers of high growth companies would depend on external finance for 
investment purposes. But this is not clearly explained by the debt position of high 
growth companies. The significant differences observed in MY A and FCFD seem to 
undermine the accuracy ofthe PIE ratio as a measure of growth. 
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6.5 DEBT POLICY OF MANAGER CONTROLLED COMPANIES 
The debt policy of low growth manager controlled companies and high growth 
manager controlled companies are compared in this section. The emphasis here is on 
the growth factor and the results will determine whether low growth manager 
controlled companies differ from high growth manager controlled companies in terms 
of the proportion ofdebt assumed. 
6.5.1 Total Debt to Total Assets 
The box and whisker plots for low growth and high growth manager controlled 
companies are shown in Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14, and descriptive statistics are 
reported in Table 6.7. 
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6.5.2 Long-term Debt to Total Assets 
Box and whisker plots for both groups are presented in Figures 6.15 and 6.16. A table 
of descriptive statistics is presented in Table 6.8. 
R!Jle6.15t.1is1l'1:is Figse 6. lS1Iedal1'l:is 
~ CIJt\jed Caqxries ~ CatcIOO Caqxries 
~!letti)Tit/I-. l.a¢"m!lett to TIt/I-. 
8J 
I
t!i) 
11 
II) 
~«l 
~ 
1-]) 
15 
~ 
~<l): ~ . .~1 
.3 
. I 
-1 
lM~ H~~ 
T)'I:e 
Table 6.8 
Descriptive Statistics for Manager Controlled Companies 
Lon!!-term Debt to Total A 
Statistics Low High 
Count 
Mean 
Median 
Standard Error 
Lower Quartile 
Upper Quartile 
Quartile Range 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
28 
5.60 
2.38 
1.35 
1.15 
8.08 
6.94 
1.98 
4.34 
30 
8.84 
4.53 
2.42 
0.70 
8.86 I 
8.16 
2.70 
8.64 
T-TEST 
t-stat -1.55 
p-value 0.13 I 
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Table 6.9 

Descriptive Statistics for Manager Controlled Companies 

Free Cash Flow Invested 

-
Statistics Low High I 
Count 
Mean 
19 
94.05 
24 
114.61 I 
Median 71.10 97.53 
Standard Error 18.35 14.47 
Lower Quartile 47.09 58.61 
Upper Quartile 125.98 134.74 
Quartile Range 78.89 76.13 
Skewness 2.72 1.91 
Kurtosis 9.42 4.79 
T-TEST 
t-stat -1.58 
p-value 0.12 
The box and whisker plots show that high growth companies invest a greater 
proportion of FCF than low growth companies. The means are 94.05% and 114.61 % 
for low growth and high growth companies respectively. The median plots depict an 
overlapping which hints at similarity in the proportion of FCF invested. This 
characteristic is symbolised by the close quartile ranges of both groups. Low growth 
companies have a quartile range of 78.89% and the quartile range for high growth 
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companies is 76.13%. In this case, agency costs ofFCF should be low for low growth 
companies as they invest less FCF. This is because the tendency to waste FCF on 
unprofitable investments should be low. The results of the t-test do not reveal any 
significant difference in the proportion ofFCF invested by low growth and high growth 
companies. The p-value is 0.12 and the t-stat is -1.58. 
6.6.2 Market Value Added 
The means and medians of both groups are compared in box and whisker plots in 
Figures 6.19 and 6.20. Table 6.10 reports the descriptive statistics for the two groups. 
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Table 6.10 
Descriptive Statistics for Manager Controlled Companies 

Market Value Added 

Statistics Low High 
Count 28 30 
Mean 431.78 167.98 
Median 246.58 71.68 
Standard Error 92.37 43.01 
Quartile Range 627.41 154.81 
28.30Lower Quartile 64.57 
Upper Quartile 691.98 183.11 
Minimum -69.79 -36.62 
Maximum 1657.14 978.77 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
u-stat 292.00 
p-value 0.04 
It can be seen from the box and whisker plots that low growth manager controlled 
companies create greater wealth for shareholders than high growth manager controlled 
companies. Whereas the mean MY A of low growth companies is 431.77%, that of 
high growth companies is 167.98%. The medians are 246.58% and 71.68% for low 
growth and high growth companies respectively. 
The statistics presented in Table 6.10 show substantial variability between the two 
categories. Low growth manager controlled companies have a wide quartile range of 
627.41%. This is approximately four times the quartile range of high growth 
companies. From this it can be concluded that high growth companies achieve very 
low returns for their shareholders. 
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The Mann-Whitney U test confirms that the differences between low growth and high 
growth manager controlled companies are significant at 95% confidence level. This 
result follows the same trend as owner controlled companies in Section 6.2.2. The 
results may be influenced by the effectiveness of the PIE ratio as a measure of growth. 
6.7 DIVIDEND POLICY OF MANAGER CONTROLLED COMPANIES 
In this section, the dividend policy of low growth manager controlled companies and 
high growth manager controlled companies are compared. The hypothesis to be 
examined is whether or not the dividend payout ofboth groups are similar. 
6.7.1 Free Cash Flow for Dividends 
The groups are compared in box and whisker plots in Figures 6.21 and 6.22. Table 
6.11 reports the descriptive statistics for low growth manager controlled companies 
and high growth manager controlled companies. 
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Table 6.11 
Descriptive Statistics for Manager Controlled Companies 

Free Cash Flow for Dividends 

HighStatistics Low 
I 
19 24I 	Count 
Mean 28.05 31.42 
I Median 22.04 29.15 
I Standard Error 4.93 2.68 
11.55 20.86 
Upper Quartile 
I Lower Quartile 
40.99 38.95 
Quartile Range 29.44 18.09 
Skewness 1.12 1.13 
0.47 1.63 
I 
IT-TEST 
It-stat -1.20 
p-value 0.24 
I Kurtosis 
High growth manager controlled companies pay a higher proportion of FCF as 
dividends than low growth manager controlled companies. In addition, high growth 
companies are concentrated in a small range as indicated by the relatively low quartile 
range of 18.09%. Both the mean and median FCFD of high growth companies are 
slightly higher than those of low growth companies. The means are 28.05% and 
31.42% for low growth and high growth companies respectively. The medians are 
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22.04% for the low growth group and 29.15% for the high growth group. It can be 
deduced from the median plots that majority of low growth companies pay below 30% 
of FCF as dividends. Fifty per cent (50%) of high growth companies payout FCF 
between the range of 20% and 40%. In spite of the observation that high growth 
companies are quite distinct from low growth companies, the t-test does not report 
any statistically significant result. The null hypothesis of no difference in the level of 
FCF paid as dividends is therefore accepted. 
6.7.2 Dividend Payout 
Figure 6.23 compares the means of low growth and high growth manager controlled 
companies and Figure 6.24 compares the medians of both groups. Table 6.12 lists the 
descriptive statistics for both groups. 
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Table 6.12 
Descriptive Statistics for Manager Controlled Companies 

Dividend Pavout 

Statistics Low ~ High I 
Count 26 30 I 
Mean 30.10 35.10 ! 
Median 26.99 36.08 
Standard Error 3.16 2.35 
Lower Quartile 18.59 26.63 
Upper Quartile 33.99 43 .93 
Quartile Range 15.40 17.30 
Skewness 1.20 -0.21 
Kurtosis 0.66 -0.20 I 
T-TEST 
t-stat -1.06 
p-value 0.29 
I 
I 
The impression obtained from the box and whisker plots is that high growth manager 
controlled companies pay slightly higher dividends than low growth manager 
controlled companies. The mean payout of low growth companies is 30.10% whilst 
the mean payout of high growth companies is 35.10%. The medians also follow this 
trend. They are 26.99% for the low growth group and 36.08% for high growth group. 
These differences are however not significant. The t-stat is -1.06 and the p-value is 
0.29. 
6.8 SUMMARY 
The debt policy of low growth manager controlled companies is not different from the 
debt policy of high growth manager controlled companies. It can therefore be inferred 
that growth prospects have limited influence on debt policy. Thus the bonding role of 
debt is diminished in this respect. Also, high growth companies invest a greater 
percentage of FCF than low growth companies. The above findings are consistent 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 

CONCLUSION 

7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between shareholders and managers is believed to affect the financial 
policies of companies. Within the agency framework, shareholders are considered as 
the principals and managers are regarded as the agents. The main issue arising from 
this relationship is whether the agents will always place the interests of the principals 
above their own interests. The interest of shareholders lies in the maximisation oftheir 
wealth. Ideally, the decisions of managers should contribute positively to the wealth 
of shareholders. But there could be deviations from this course due to certain factors. 
These deviations bring about agency costs. Agency costs are the sum of the losses 
suffered by shareholders as a result of managerial actions which are not value 
maximising. Some factors which influence the cost of deviations include the tastes of 
managers, the laws of the land and the environment in which the company operates. 
To limit the degree of losses incurred by shareholders, some mechanisms aimed at 
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders have been suggested. These 
measures range from monitoring mechanisms such as internal control systems to 
bonding mechanisms such as the code of ethics of managers. This study proposed that 
the percentage of shareholding of managers is likely to affect the debt, investment and 
dividend policies of companies. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Price/Earnings Ratios for companies in the Industrial Sector I 
1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 
ABI 25.74 23.37 20.05 CHUBB 3.49 4.55 9.49 
ACREM 0 2.03 2.18 CITYHLD 12.82 6.35 8.41 
ADCOCK 22.25 17.78 15.69 CITYLDG 17.26 23.96 22.35 
ADMIRAL 0 0 o CLINICS 5.26 7.25 7.05 
ADONIS 71.11 10.44 3.27 CLYDE 2.47 3.12 6.76 
ADVTECH 0 8.64 8.5 CMH 2.76 4.62 6.3 
7.79AECI 13.05 14.6 8.21 CMI 0 0 
AF-&-OVER 4.22 7.65 6.31 CNAGALO 15.9 21.84 18.42 
AFCOL 7.34 11.48 13.7 COASTAL 0 0 0 
AFROX 22.18 26.8 22.35 COATES 7.48 8.89 7.95 
AKJ 4.05 4.74 8.22 CONCOR 2.89 6.35 9.47 
ALEXNDR 8.15 8.55 8.97 CONFRAM 0 13.17 4.47 
ALEXWYT 3.39 5.67 10.71 CONSOL 15.82 20.85 16.46 
ALLWEAR 1.47 5.17 5.44 CONTRAV 8.33 8.21 0 
ALTECH 15.76 16.66 15.72 CONTROL 11.2 21 11.05 
ALTRON 14.44 14.9 11.99 COPI 33.74 28.71 21.01 
AMREL 9.11 15.25 8.42 CORNICK 0 0 0 
ANBEECO 3.27 6.89 5.21 CRENDEL 52.94 0 1.66 
ANG-ALPHA 15.09 20.14 18.35 CROOKES 7.51 15.2 10.47 
ARIES 8.12 9 9.55 CTP 6.65 8.98 9.68 
AROMA 6.25 9.17 10.39 CUTRITE 5.07 4.15 3.87 
ASEAN 0 0 o DA-GAMA 5.89 8.24 
25 
7.88 
13.63 AUKLAND 0 0 10.67 DAEWOO 5.58 
AUTOMKR 0 0 o DALYS 73.82 59.18 61 .03 
AUTOPGE 8.04 13.14 61.67 DATATEC 0 0 13.31 
AUTOQIP 2.78 3.01 3.45 DECHOLD 1.46 3.86 1.55 
BAS READ 0 0 o DELFOOD 11.98 11.45 0 
BATECOR 0 0 21.61 DELSWA 2.58 6.18 3.55 
BATEPRO 0 2.76 3.45 DELTA 17.38 18.83 15.36 
BEARMAN 4.32 10.14 15.92 DIALMOV 0.77 0 0 
BELL 0 0 o DIDATA 23.8 21.12 24.52 
BERTRAD 0 0 o DISTIL 9.7 9.09 11.73 
BERZACK 6.91 16.01 9.26 DON 14.02 10.74 0 
BEVCON 19.83 25.45 21.21 DORBYL 7.38 30.99 0 
BICAF 1.04 2.26 2.56 ED-LBATE 15.73 16.92 15.96 
BIVEC 8.81 17.03 8.83 EDGARS 18.37 25.88 23.04 
BOLWEAR 4.02 6.08 6.86 ELLERINE 9.26 20.19 12.84 
BONNITA 0 0 10.58 ENGEN 15.62 15.54 18.6 
BOUMAT 7.08 8.98 9.3 ENSIGN 0 0 0 
BOWCALF 15.88 15 16.98 ESIC 0 0 51.67 
BRENMIL 6.98 8.67 7.38 EVERITE 17.73 42.46 15.67 
BURLlNGTN 4.87 6.25 9.21 EVHOLD 19.01 41.04 16.38 
CADSWEP 25.4 21.67 22.26 FINTECH 10.92 10.41 14.17 
CARE 0 16.12 9.37 FMCOTEC 4.14 8.93 0 
CARGO 6.84 4.91 4.33 FOODCRP 15.27 16.24 17.08 
CASHBIL 31.84 15.25 27.37 FOSCHINI 23.52 28.24 23.83 
CAXTON 6.21 13.17 10.24 FRALEX 7.34 8.56 7.96 
CEMENCO 11.85 51.79 7.5 FRAME 0 12.77 4.63 
CERAMIC 3.93 7.85 6.39 FRANSAF 10.47 25.58 12.05 
CGS-FOOD 15.65 17.17 16.71 FRIDGEM 0 0 0 
CHEMSERVE 11.5 12.75 1.23 G5HOLD 1.92 12.23 8.51 
CHOICE 0 6.73 10.52 GEN-OPTIC 4.94 10.14 19.82 
CHROME 0 0 o GENTECH 0_46.55 0 
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1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 
GENTYRE-A 5.38 6.61 16.97 MASHOLD 0 0 3.83 
GENTYRE-B 0 0 o MASONITE 7 7.29 9.51 
GLODINA 3.6 3.83 3.41 MAST 3.96 6.55 0 
GOLDSTEIN 2.06 11.88 8.46 MATH-ASH 0 47.82 0 
GRINAKER 6.86 12.69 10.76 MATHOMO 0 0 0 
GRINTEK 7.5 8.62 9.15 MCCARTHY 4.97 12.96 14.21 
GROUP-5 2.08 12.48 9.41 MCRTAIL 4.55 13.9 15.53 
GUBINGS 8.23 4.08 5.56 MEDCLIN 13.19 7.34 6.57 
GYPSUM 7.6 6.12 9.22 MEDEX 6.76 0 6.58 
HAGGlE 9.99 12.52 8.49 MEDHOLD 7.86 6.72 7.7 
HARVEYS 9.19 0 20.48 METAIR 3.12 4.65 7.65 
HARWILL 18.65 31.85 15.12 METCASH 17.59 19.47 19.39 
HICORL 6.92 6.55 5.25 METKOR 19.84 23.85 0 
HIVELD 18.56 29.58 10.94 MGX 0 0 0 
HLH 0 21.89 53.84 MIDAS 0 4.91 9.34 
HOECHST 0 0 12.59 MIH 0 0 0 
HORTORS 6.56 9.68 16.41 MOBILE 15.69 18.71 16.72 
HOWDEN 0 0 o MORKELS 3.86 6.98 7.6 
HSEWARE 0 0 12.47 MOTOLNK 3.27 3.73 20.31 
HUDACO 9.15 16.33 14.98 MULTI 7.72 9.26 9.67 
HUNTCOR 29.11 22.2 53.59 NAMFISH 11.16 5.93 0 
I-&-J 18.04 16.61 16.82 NAMPAK 15.94 18.54 18.08 
IBJOFFE 0 28.67 18.75 NAMSEA 4.28 5.65 6.54 
IBMSA 8.83 12.75 17.67 NASPERS 0 0 14.41 
ICS 10.06 13.01 11.16 NATCHIX 0 0 0 
ILCO 5.68 20.11 o NATRAWL 7.2 0 0 
ILLOVO 8.83 15.23 11.62 NEI-AFR 0 10.93 0 
INDNEWS 0 0 o NEIHOLD 0 10.64 0 
INMINS 3.39 12.83 4.53 NINIAN 5.15 2.88 3.28 
INTELES 16.43 20.61 19.9 NORBAKE 5.75 0 0 
I NVICTA 17.86 0 11.34 NUCLICKS 21 .21 33.18 22.82 
ISCOR 8.15 12.56 10.88 NUWORLD 16.77 18.11 22.35 
ITLTILE 3.45 7.43 9.56 OAKFLDS 0 0 0 
JADE 15.08 18.13 17.7 OCEANA 19.81 18.94 18.99 
JASCO 4.02 6.67 13.33 OCFISH 8.57 8.95 9.97 
JDGROUP 3.17 0 13.47 OMEGA 0 0 0 
KAROS 4.3 0 o OMNIA 8.27 11.07 0 
KERSAF 15.64 22.03 11.97 OMNICOR 12.92 15.64 20.57 
KJARO 0 0 13.59 OPUS 26.74 0 0 
KOHLER 11 .2 15.13 14.13 OTIS 5.26 8.63 8.83 
KOLOSUS 0 0 7.23 PALS 3.38 2.5 4.31 
KWV-BEL 8.67 11.07 10.19 PENROSE 0 0 0 
L-T-A 3.48 14.42 15.06 PEP 24.14 18.35 24.27 
LANGEBERG 8.91 9.13 9.68 PEPGRO 21 .16 15.65 53.56 
LASER 5.77 6.32 o PEPKOR 23.12 18.5 16.77 
LEFIC 22.24 26.55 21.78 PERSBEL 0 0 8.55 
LESRNET 0 0 o PERSKOR 6.74 9.25 8.31 
LITHO 4.52 5.02 6.44 PERSTEL 0 0 14.19 
LOGTEK 8.19 5.97 7.48 PICKNPAY 22.66 20.76 17.89 
LONSUGR 10.51 14.38 12.67 PIKWIK 40.73 34.4 26.67 
M-CELL 0 0 o PLASTAL 0 11.03 4.38 
M-NET 0 0 o PLESSEY 0 0 0 
MACADAM 2 4.04 4.87 POINTER 13.33 0 0 
MACMED 14.64 10.27 12.67 POLIFIN 0 0 0 
MASCON 0 O · o PORT 9.73 28.29 8.07 
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PORTHLD 0.29 1.6 1.18 TELJOY 8.5 9.85 329.33 
POWTECH 13.81 12.58 16.15 TEX-MILLS 0 0 0 
PPC 15.45 24.82 18.6 TIGR-OATS 16.49 17.16 17.35 
PREM-GRP 16.67 20.76 18.59 TIHOLD 6.02 10.29 17.53 
PREMPHARM 17.61 20.62 16.58 TIWHEEL 6.06 10.15 18.56 
PRESMED 19.43 11.97 9.21 TMX 113.06 70 154.34 
PRIME 0 410 95.75 TOLARAM 9.45 7.51 5.1 
PROFURN 4.35 6.09 6.98 TONGAAT 10.59 17.61 14.97 
PROGRESS 0 0 oTOYOTA 8.57 8.89 6.47 
PUBHOLD 10.96 6.04 6.28 TPN 4.68 9.43 6.25 
PUBLICO 9.42 6.53 4.43 TRADHLD 18.79 16.36 12.08 
PUTCO 4.53 5.92 4.81 TRENCOR 16.13 19.12 16.16 
Q-DATA 16.11 25.56 18.83 TRNPACO 4.11 0 2.54 
RAINBOW 0 77.02 60.41 UNIHOLD 11.82 6.73 6.32 
REGGIES 5.77 0 5 UNISPIN 0 6.67 3.33 
REUNERT 11.62 18.14 19.29 UNITRAN 10.24 13.49 11.73 
REX-TRUE 4.99 8.53 7.05 USKO 0 6.76 7.3 
ROADCOR 0 3.03 oVALAUTO 0 4.17 5.77 
ROMATEX 4.37 11.96 7.78 VALCAR 0 5.13 8.33 
S&SHOLD 3.13 7.66 9.71 VENTEL 7.03 4.48 3.47 
SA-BREWS 20.07 25.57 21 .56 VENTRON 15.38 16.39 15.17 
SA-DRUG 20.98 19.97 16.9 VOLTEX 7.27 16.03 10.23 
SAB-IND 4.82 6.94 oWALHOLD 22.07 28.86 0 
SAPPI 11.44 10.51 7.51 WALTONS 7.48 9.77 9.08 
SASOL 7.92 9.78 9.3 WBHOLD 0 8.3 11 .32 
SCHAMIN 8.2 10.42 13.65 WBHOVCO 2.56 7.93 8.39 
SCHARIG 6.1 10.09 13.46 WESCO 8.33 8.17 7.11 
SEAHARV 11.28 13.68 9.98 WINBEL 6.67 12.38 0 
SEARCON 9.62 29.29 21.65 WINHOLD 4.5 8.93 3.33 
SEARDEL 2 6.58 4.81 WOOLTRU 23.68 25.11 23.87 
SEARTEC 0 0 8.78 YORKCOR 0 10.95 6.79 
SENTRCHEM 11.34 14.77 11.31 I 
SERVGRO 11.99 14.77 17.56 I 
SFW 5.76 19.17 7.73 
SHARIND 0 16.7 13.86 
SHOPRIT 21.1 18.09 13.47 
SHOREDITS 1.61 9.91 5.62 
SILTEK 9.07 13.68 11.32 
SISA 12.64 20.35 9.82 
SMART 16.38 15.44 17.2 
SOLCHEM 4.61 6.49 7.41 
SONDOR 4.2 7.03 8.33 
SOVFOOD 0 0 0 
SPECLTY 8.94 16.16 21.77 
SPES COM 7.82 7.94 9.62 
SPICER 0 6.32 8.19 
SPUR 23.57 18.12 15.45 
SPURHLD 22.96 19.6 16.69 
STEERS 0 0 18.14 
STERLING 10.34 23.33 0 
STOCKS 3.21 7.91 9.04 
STORECO 23.55 44.97 62.25 
SUNCRUSH 111.53 18.26 20.51 
T-E-J 0 0.74 1.87 
.!:..M-L ___16.57 _ 14.24 29.65 
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Growth Owner 
Controlled Companies 
Arthur Kaplan Jewellery 
AI/wear 
Anbeeco 
Hieor 
Italtile 
Log Holdings 
Macadams Bakery 
Medhold 
Puteo 
C:::t"Inti,...r Industries 
SOlesc:om I=I.....-trt"lni ..... 
TPN Investments 
Ventel 
APPENDIX 2 
Growth Owner 
Controlled Companies 
Allied Technologies 
Bowler Metcalf 
Edward Bateman 
Oceana Investment 
Pick'N 
Spur 
Suncrush 
Telemetrix 
Treneor 
Ventron 
Low Growth Mana!:ler 
r.:nntrnlllA>ri 
DaGama 
DecorIDistillers 
Grintek 
Namibia Products 
Otis Elevator 
Portland 
Protea Fumishers 
Solchem Investments 
Tolaram 
Toyota 
Waltons 
Dimension Data 
Stores 
Engen 
Foodeorp 
Hunteor 
Irvin & Johnson 
I 
Tiger 
Wooltru 
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APPENDIX 3 
701 139521 
73633 
703 213154 
704 9410 
705 o 
3170 
7394 
Receivable -5733 
increalseJ'dec:::re<ase Account Payable 1509 
Loans o 
225734 
-9537 
55439 
179832 
10406 
o 
169426 
1 
719 133993 
720 Increase In Investments o 
n".~C!tr"t'lAI"'f In SubSidiaries 
414 
Ex Invest Activity 	 6954 
724 	 Proceeds Disp Fixed Asset 6954 
Proceeds Disp Investment o 
Other Proceeds o 
727 	 21839 
nl"r,..",,,,..I1'1I"""'.·.,,,,,,~,,,, Long Term Liabilities o 
nl"r,.."'<!'A/,."A....·A<lI'~ Short Term Liabilities 
-21 
Capital o 
o 
732 Cash Utilised 	 -21839 
Other Income 
714 Cash Available 
715 
716 
717 
718 
 Fixed ,,=='''' 
721 Net I vestment i  UiDSj(:iiali  
728 I crease/decrease  r  i iliti s 
r  i iliti  
Flow 
(R'OOOs) 
a
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
